Government has announced two major reshuffles in the form of restructuring of Railways and Defence Ministry. The Railways are clearly in need of reforms, they needed a hiving off into separate stand alone companies with Passenger, freight and infrastructure elements, and to have a regulatory body that would look into safety and accident investigations. The Infrastructure elements other than railway stations are integral to rail functioning as core competencies of the Railways, so railway stations can be carved out into a separate entity as largely the same is one of hospitality and transient hosting of goods and passengers.
So what have we achieved? A Railway Board reconstitution. A new unified cadre of IR which will create one omnibus IR employee with straight jacket ing of terms and conditions, making for a one size fits all approach in cadre management for a business of extreme specialisations as signalling, track inspections, to load mastering for freight, to engine maintenance for locomotives.
Did any one mention that the Indian Railways has one of the most professional set of cadres, which have been exemplary in the routine in their professionalism, never resorting to usual methods that make us averse to unionism and labour rights activities? So are Railway employees being rewarded for their professionalism by this ‘kichdi’ approach that premises cost saving?
Many core passenger relating activities like ticketing, catering, upholstery were long ago diluted from the IR and either hived off or ended up privatised. That Indian Railways suffered due to cross subsidy, which was not offered the budgetary support it should have got. Even the safety spends for improving railway safety or the infrastructure costs were not to accrue from the union budget, but from internal raising of resources. Now after losing its budget, Railways loses it’s board. The IAS take over of the IR is complete, with new board members having nominations from other fields as ‘experts’. Actually many of the changes are those that were result of studies and discussions that were in the pipeline. The recommending members of the committee is like the Brains Trust of India, led by Dr Bibek Debroy, including Gurcharan Das, and if the outcome is so underwhelming then you know why! It is because, Mr Modi has defined his helming of affairs with incrementalism, even the replacement of Planning Commission with Niti Ayog is more in the direction of a half measure than a clear break from the past or legacy!
The Department of Military Affairs is one which the CDS will get to head as a four star general. He will be the first among the Service Chiefs. He will not be the ‘single point’ source of military advice to the government, not with each Service Chief still in charge of respective services, from personnel, to tactical and strategic control. Will he replace the existing Defence Secretary? Fat chance, the IAS will make such a major concession, even fatter is the simple screen or euphemism called civilian control over military, which instead of political control operates as bureaucratic control in India. So the CDS will now be one more layer, rather than the projection screen on which the higher defence management will occur. The permanent COSC is the only hat which has some heft, but here too, the Fourth Horseman will soon find the other three manoeuvring to reduce items for COSC, finding other avenues to peruse and pursue agenda, may be using the Ministry route if possible. Will CDS have financial powers bigger than the secretary of the Ministry? Will the powers be equal of the Cabinet Secretary? Will CDS be secretary of the Cabinet Committee on Security? Or will he now be a part of the COSC ( the Military Wing of the Cabinet Secretariat) and in a rung clearly below the political appointee NSA?
Initial news suggests that the CDS will not have operational salience, that he will not have command and control over formations of the military. That is in itself a big set back to the concept of the office. No one quite expected the CDS in India to be a Supreme Commander of the Forces, that is what the President is. But if the military was to be truly integrated, the better example we have is of the US model, where the command structure is ‘theatre’ or region wise, and we can see the IAF killing the issue, by forwarding a theory of the IAF entirely being one theatre countrywide with its regional commands being worked as sub theatres. Of course force levels are definitely one issue with a air power like India. If one looks at strategic bombing, deep strike and early warning radar platforms with refuelling mid air, India’s force levels perhaps are such that the IAF chiefs have felt over the years as being worthy of treatment as just one single unit. The Navy could also feel the same way with low levels of submarine and just one operational carrier group, that it is just a coastal Navy and therefore for purposes of force projection, the entire naval assets are like a force level for one theatre. Only the Army always sanctioned and positioned due to our borders the way it is, can arguably be three theatres, Northern, Western and Eastern. In whatever wars we have fought, we know why in 1962 the IAF was not deployed, from Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru’s letters to President JFK declassified. 1948, 1991 were border static wars, where Indian military was using its might to evict intruders in one state-Kashmir! 1965 was a war across an entire front- Western but one where both Pakistan and India did not open other theatres and saw limited involvement of navies and air power. 1971 is what we have closest to all out war, and across theatres both Western and Eastern, with preponderance of Eastern theatre. We saw the use of submarines, air craft carrier, close air support in defence and offence, and where arguably India showcased her military might as a joint fighting military as it was then visualised. Today, hyperwar is entirely different in its scope, and we can see how India’s military planners see it, from how the Army is trying to enlarge her wings as it were, squabbling for rotor lift and strike capability as well as UAV based platforms with the IAF.
The Integrated Head Quarters that was formed after Kargil has skirted these core issues, or has been unable to curb turf tendencies. Under the head of an officer one echelon less than the Chiefs made it vulnerable to being brushed aside. Now with an officer senior most under whose office the CISC as principal staff officer to the CDS will be, one expects the IDS to function as a strategic planner and doctrinal fountainhead for the Defence Ministry while the Department of Military Affairs is likely to be the financial and administrative head for force levels, personnel, for revenue and capital expenditures and budgeting, so will Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) now get cracking under the CDS? India lags in co-opting the parliamentary committees for ‘oversight’ in strategic matters that would make it ‘bipartisan’ as it happens in US, France and UK. Having a Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence is meaningless if we don’t have a Parliamentary Defence Acquisition Board that hears Defence Acquisition plans, enquires about the state of budgetary spends and plans for current and future fiscal years like how the Senate Defence Appropriations Committee does for the US military. Only if Parliamentary scrutiny happens in day to day defence ministerial matters would the CDS evolve over years, avoiding the trap of bureaucratic wrangling and stifling that can snuff out the enthusiasm of the political executive for structural reform in India!
In bits and pieces, reform is better than to maintain status quo. Of course, I aspire for the ideal of an overhauled structure more in line with tomorrow’s requirement than yesterday’s desired change. If I have to settle for less, then I guess I can settle for these crumbs. At least they offer the promise that real change may still come about in India.
indiarubberman.com 